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Abstract
The author explores the role of governance mechanisms as a means of reducing ﬁnancial fragility.
First, he develops a simple theoretical general-equilibrium model in which instability arises due to
an agency problem resulting from a conﬂict of interest between the borrower and lender. In
particular, when governance is weak and transaction costs are high, the share of capital assets that
creditors can claim as collateral is highly sensitive to shocks. As a result, there is ﬁnancial
fragility, in that the willingness of agents to ﬁnance productive investments is sensitive to shocks.
Second, using a data set that contains over 90 industrialized and developing economies, the author
tests the hypothesis that governance is important in explaining ﬁnancial fragility (measured as the
likelihood of a banking crisis and investment volatility). His results show that institutions, rules,
and laws that govern the ﬁnancial environment are of ﬁrst-order importance for the stability of
ﬁnancial systems. The author ﬁnds that, while better legal systems are particularly important, so
are democratic institutions that limit the power of the executive.
JEL classiﬁcation: G0
Bank classiﬁcation: Business ﬂuctuations and cycles; Financial markets
Résumé
L’auteur examine le rôle des mécanismes de gouvernance comme moyen de réduire la fragilité
ﬁnancière. Premièrement, il élabore un modèle théorique simple d’équilibre général dans lequel
un problème de délégation issu d’un conﬂit d’intérêts entre l’emprunteur et le prêteur crée de
l’instabilité. En particulier, lorsque la gouvernance est faible et que les coûts de transaction sont
élevés, la part des immobilisations que les créanciers peuvent demander en garantie est très
sensible aux chocs. Il y a par conséquent fragilité ﬁnancière, dans la mesure où la volonté des
agents de ﬁnancer les investissements productifs est sensible aux chocs. Deuxièmement, à l’aide
d’un ensemble de données portant sur plus de 90 économies industrialisées et en développement,
l’auteur teste l’hypothèse voulant que la gouvernance permette d’expliquer la fragilité ﬁnancière
(mesurée par la probabilité d’une crise bancaire et la volatilité des investissements). Les résultats
obtenus indiquent que les institutions, les règles et les lois qui régissent le secteur ﬁnancier jouent
un rôle de premier ordre dans la stabilité des systèmes ﬁnanciers. L’auteur constate que, si de
meilleurs systèmes juridiques revêtent une grande importance, c’est également le cas des
institutions démocratiques qui limitent le pouvoir exécutif.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G0
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques; Marchés ﬁnanciers1
1. Introduction
Following a period of ﬁnancial turbulence during the latter half of the 19th and early 20th
centuries, the world entered a period of relative stability, though one in which global markets were
heavily regulated and controlled.  As Allen and Gale (Forthcoming) point out, however, the
reliance on severe intervention came at the cost of economic efﬁciency. A subsequent rethink and
ﬁnancial deregulation have revealed weaknesses in many ﬁnancial markets and resulted in a
return to ﬁnancial instability around the globe. A search is therefore underway for the sources of
ﬁnancial fragility, in the hopes of eliminating the costs associated with a ﬁnancial crisis without
the costs of excessive regulation.1
Since the 1998 Asian crisis, there has been a growing consensus that governance (that is, the
“rules of the game” that govern the way economic agents interact) can play an important role in
determining the fragility of ﬁnancial markets (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales 1998).  This
paper examines the link between governance and ﬁnancial fragility in more detail. First, a simple
theoretical model is developed that links ﬁnancial fragility and the cost of enforcing a ﬁnancial
arrangement between borrower and lender.  The model is used to demonstrate that ﬁnancial
fragility can be mitigated by governance mechanisms that lower this cost. Second, the link is
examined empirically.  The ﬁndings are consistent with the view that good governance is
important for ensuring the stability of the ﬁnancial system.
The view in this paper is that ﬁnancial fragility occurs when the willingness of economic agents to
continue to ﬁnance positive net present-value investment opportunities is susceptible to relatively
small economic shocks; this may be true even if these events have no direct impact on the
fundamentals of the economy. With this deﬁnition in mind, it is clear that, for ﬁnancial fragility to
arise, markets must fail.2,3
There are many reasons why markets fail, but the view in this paper is that the key source of
market failure is a combination of (i) asymmetric information, (ii) the conﬂict of interest between
borrowers and lenders, and (iii) poor governance (that is, a lack of appropriate rules, both explicit
1. It is well documented that the costs of ﬁnancial crises are enormous. Honohan (1997) estimates that
justthepublicsectorcostsofresolvingbankingcrisesindevelopingcountriesbetween1980and1995




to be transmitted through the economy via ﬁnancial markets, these ﬂuctuations are optimal and not
consistent with the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial fragility used inthis paper.
3. Bordo (1986) provides an excellent historical account and review of the earlier literature.2
and implicit, that govern the environment in which economic transactions are made).  Together,
these features produce so-called “agency problems” that prevent market participants from making
economically efﬁcient transactions. This viewpoint is certainly not unique. The ﬁnance literature
stresses that agency problems are a key source of market failure in ﬁnancial markets.4  Mishkin
(2001, 3) goes further and deﬁnes a ﬁnancial crisis as the “disruption to ﬁnancial markets in
which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that ﬁnancial
markets are unable to efﬁciently channel funds to those who have the most productive investment
opportunities.” Given such problems, many authors (e.g., Zingales 1998) argue that good
governance plays an important role in alleviating the potential inefﬁciencies these asymmetric
information problems cause. This paper stresses the importance of agency problems as the
underlying source of ﬁnancial fragility, and the role of good governance in mitigating ﬁnancial
fragility.
From a theoretical standpoint, this paper is in keeping with the branch of research on ﬁnancial
multipliers (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) and credit cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997).5 In those
papers, because of an agency problem, the ability of investors to raise credit and ﬁnance
investment is determined by the health of their “balance sheets” and their ability to provide
collateral. As a result, some investors are credit constrained and a small shock to the economy
can, via the pecuniary externality on the ﬁrm’s balance sheet, have a substantial impact on the
level of credit provision and investment.  In keeping with the research papers, the model
developed in section 2 incorporates a borrowing constraint for some ﬁrms in the economy, which
limits their ability to ﬁnance investment and production.  The extent of the constraint is
endogenously determined and the resulting equilibrium exhibits multiplier effects. Interestingly,
the model also exhibits another important source of instability: multiple equilibria. In particular,
for some range of parameter values, a small shock is likely to produce a sudden jump in the
equilibrium outcome that is not easily reversed by a change in parameter values.  That is, the
economy also exhibits fragility of a form that can be referred to as ﬁnancial hysteresis.
From an empirical viewpoint, this paper is related to the recent literature on systemic banking
crises (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, henceforth DKD, 1998a and b, 2002; Santor 2003).
Those authors focus on the macroeconomic determinants of banking crises. Thus, their papers are
very much in keeping with the business cycle view of banking crises (Mitchell 1941; Gorton
4. The ﬁnance literature also stresses agency problems between ﬁrm owners and managers (Jensenand
Meckling 1976). Theseproblems are certainly important,and closely related to this paper’s
standpoint, butthey are not the main focus in this paper.
5. There is also a similarity between the model developed here and the new generation of currency crisis
models developed by Krugman (1999, 2001).3
1988).6 However, all of these studies also ﬁnd support for the notion that better enforcement of
property rights can lessen the likelihood of a crisis, a ﬁnding that is in keeping with the recent
corporate governance literature (see Zingales 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny, henceforth LLSV, 1998).  The empirical part of this paper explores this last aspect in
more detail, and asks whether governance mechanisms other than the rule of law can also affect
the likelihood of a crisis. In that sense, this paper is more closely related to the empirical work of
Johnson et al. (2000), who ﬁnd that various measures of corporate governance can explain recent
emerging-market crises better than standard macroeconomic variables.7
Like Johnson et al., the empirical ﬁndings reported in this paper suggest that governance
deﬁnitely matters for ﬁnancial stability, both in terms of a reduced likelihood of a banking crisis
and reduced investment volatility. Moreover, the nature of the governance mechanism is
important. In particular, while better bureaucracies seem to help, so do mechanisms that make
governments more accountable to the public, such as democracy, competition in the political
process, and constraints on executive power. On the other hand, institutions that tend to increase
government control and inﬂuence tend to increase the likelihood of crisis.
This paper is also related to the rapidly growing literature on governance and economic
development (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; Easterly and Levine 2002). Using a
variety of governance indicators (many also used in this paper), these authors demonstrate that
there is a causal link between better governance and economic development. While this paper
does not test this link empirically, the model developed in section 2 demonstrates that institutions
that improve contractability also lead to higher levels of investment and output.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple theoretical model that provides
some insight into the link between ﬁnancial fragility and governance. Section 3 sets out the
empirical methodology to be used to test the hypothesis that governance matters for ﬁnancial
fragility, and describes the data to be used. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
The results of this study show that institutions, rules, and laws that govern ﬁnancial relationships
are of ﬁrst-order importance for the stability of ﬁnancial systems.
6. These studies also examine some other importantcauses of systemic banking crises, including
ﬁnancial liberalization (DKD 1998a), deposit insurance (DKD 1998b, 2002), and contagion (Santor
2003).
7. This paper differsfrom Johnson et al. in two main areas. First, while Johnson et al. use currency and
stock market volatility to proxy for ﬁnancial crises, this paper uses investment volatility and systemic
banking crises, because these measures are available for a larger set of countries. Second, while
Johnson et al. examine 23 emergingeconomies during the 1997–98 period, this paper uses data from
over 90 countries from 1984 to2001.4
2. An Analytical Framework
2.1 The commitment problem
Figure 1 illustrates the payoff matrix for a “commitment” game played between a borrower (say,
an entrepreneur with a positive net present-value investment project to ﬁnance) and a lender (say,
a household). To generate a return from the investment project, both borrower and lender are
required to commit resources to the project. Thus, the lender decides whether to supply credit to
the borrower, and the borrower decides whether to commit resources (e.g., land, human capital) to
the project. The outcome of the game depends on the payoffs the two players face. A “good”
outcome is one in which the borrower has committed to repay the loan and the lender is willing to
supply credit. In Figure 1, this outcome is illustrated by the label “A.” There are a number of other
possible outcomes. Label “B” illustrates a “bad” outcome in which neither player is prepared to
commit to the project. Depending on the payoffs, the game could also produce multiple equilibria,
in which case both A and B may be equilibrium outcomes.








Ostrom (1998) refers to games like the one illustrated in Figure 1 as a second-order game. While
the outcomes of these games are clearly important, it is the ﬁrst-order game, in which the rules
and mechanisms that govern the second-order game are determined, that is of importance to the
economy.  The reason is simple.  It is the rules of the game that, by and large, determine the
payoffs agents face, and hence the outcome of the second-order game. If the “right” set of rules
are chosen (i.e., a set of rules governing the agents’ behaviour that allow them to overcome their
conﬂict of interest), then a good outcome in the ﬁrst-order game is ensured.8
In the case considered here, the purpose of the ﬁrst-order game played between borrower and
lender is to establish a set of rules that govern how the two are able to share the surplus generated
by the investment project.  There is no general theory to explain how these games are played.
Zingales (1998, 2000) argues that an understanding of the governance mechanism regarding the
division of surplus remains one of the key questions in corporate ﬁnance. Nevertheless, the rules
are clearly important, since the rules that are agreed upon (either explicitly or implicitly)
determine the payoff structure and ultimately whether the investment project is to be ﬁnanced.9
For example, consider a situation in which the two players are governed by no rules and an
absence of rights: it is most likely that, even if both players commit themselves to the investment
project, the rent-seeking free-for-all that would follow would result in the complete loss of any
surplus value that the project may have generated. As a result, an equilibrium such as B is the
likely outcome. However, if the two players are governed by a system that recognizes property
rights and that allows those rights to be contracted upon and transferred through voluntary
exchange, then outcome A can be achieved.  Somewhere in between, the two players may be
governed by a set of weakly enforced property rights. In that case, depending on the exact nature
of the rules, any version of the game is possible, including the multiple-equilibrium case, which
resembles a game of “assurance” (i.e., one in which the players play an “I’ll commit if you
commit” strategy).  Section 2.2 develops a simple model that allows these three possibilities to
arise endogenously as a function of the environment governing the ﬁnancial transaction.
8. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker(1994) use a case studyapproach to examine how ﬁrst-ordergames are
resolved in common property situations; i.e., how communities develop governance mechanisms to
allocate resources and the characteristics of successfulsolutions.
9. Zingales (1998) deﬁnes a governance system as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post
bargaining power over the quasi rents generated in the course of a relationship.6
2.2 A simple model
2.2.1 Production
The economy produces two goods, 1 and 2, and employs two ﬁxed factors of production: land, T,
and labour, N. Land is assumed to be owned by a ﬁxed number of landowners, while labour is
inelastically supplied by N workers. For reasons that will become clear, it is assumed that
landowners cannot supply labour, nor can they lease their land to workers. The economy is taken
to be small and open; however, it is assumed that there are no international capital ﬂows.
Production takes place according to constant returns to scale; however, good 1 is produced using
labour alone, while good 2 is produced using both factors. To generate a demand for credit, it is
assumed that production takes time. Speciﬁcally, land and labour are employed in the current
period, ; however, output cannot be sold until the following period, . The production
functions for the two goods are therefore:
; and, (1)
. (2)
It is assumed that  satisﬁes the standard neo-classical assumptions, , , and
. In addition, it is also assumed that . This additional assumption avoids the
value of land growing at an increasing rate with the level of employment in sector 2. Consistent
with these assumptions, it will prove convenient to assume that  has the form of a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
. (2a)
2.2.2 Firms and ﬁnancing
Now consider the ﬁnancing of production. Because production in industry 1 requires only labour,
it is assumed that ﬁrms in this sector are owned by self-employed workers. On the other hand, the
restrictions on ownership and control of land imply that ﬁrms in industry 2 are owned by
landowners. This difference in ownership across the two sectors is key, because it implies that
ﬁrms in each sector face different ﬁnancing constraints.
Because they are self-employed, workers in sector 1 face no asymmetric information or agency
problems vis-à-vis their employer. As a result, ﬁrms in this industry can self-ﬁnance, and are
therefore unconstrained in terms of the supply of credit they face.
tt 1 +
y1 t 1 + , N1 t , =
y2 t 1 + , FN 2 t , T , () =
FF N 0 > FNN 0 <
FTN 0 > FTNN 0 <
F
y2 t 1 + , N2 t ,
a T
1 a – =7
In sector 2, matters are more complicated. Although ﬁrms own their own land, they must hire
workers who are external to the ﬁrm. Moreover, they must hire them in advance of production. This
creates a demand for external ﬁnance equal to the wage bill in this sector. It is assumed that workers
are the sole source of this ﬁnance. Effectively, sector 2 ﬁrms can be thought of as having to go to a
bank (not modelled) to borrow their wage bill. The wage bill is immediately deposited into workers’
bank accounts to be spent in the subsequent period.
When borrower and lender are not the same, their incentives differ. In particular, borrowers have an
incentive not to repay creditors. This difference in incentives changes the ﬁnancing arrangements
for sector 2 ﬁrms. For example, if it is difﬁcult to claim the right to a future share of proﬁts,
creditors will not accept equity in a ﬁrm. Instead, creditors may prefer to accept a debt contract that
allows the creditor to claim a tangible asset should the borrower fail to repay.10 Under these
conditions, the most that creditors are willing to lend to borrowers is the value of collateral that
borrowers can post. In the case being considered here, it is assumed that, although borrowers cannot
credibly issue equity, they can potentially offer land as collateral, and therefore the present value of
landholdings by sector 2 ﬁrms deﬁnes an upper limit on the amount that ﬁrms in this sector can
borrow. The implication is that ﬁrms in sector 2 may be credit constrained, and therefore there may
be a limit on the size of the wage bill that they can ﬁnance.
The present value of land, , at time is simply the discounted present value of all future rental
income from land:
,
where  is the marginal product of land,  is the relative price of good 2, and  is the interest
rate.11
Consequently, the external borrowing constraint for sector 2 ﬁrms at time , , is given by:
, (3)
where  is some fraction (to be determined), .
10. This isa standard explanation for debt ﬁnancing and the importance of banks in ﬁnancial markets
relative to other forms of ﬁnancing, such as equity. See Hart (1995) for a formal discussion of debt
arising from agency problems.
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2.2.3 Governance and access to credit
In the best of cases, ; however, in reality,  is likely to be less than 1, and the maximum
ﬁrms can borrow may be less than the value of the borrower’s land. The main reason is that, in
addition to a desire to avoid repayment, the borrower has an incentive to avoid the transfer of
collateral, thereby imposing an additional cost on the lender should the borrower default. These
costs can be thought of as either a resource cost (involving the hiring of a collection agency, for
example), or, perhaps more importantly, a transaction cost, because it often takes time for
collateral to be transferred, and borrowers can be expected to defer the transfer date as long as
possible. The longer the creditor must wait, the lower the realized value of the collateral. To that
extent, in the event of default, lenders can effectively claim only a fraction, , of the value of the
collateralized land. It is reasonable to assume that increasing  comes at an increasing marginal
cost. For simplicity, assume that the marginal cost of increasing the amount of collateral the
creditor can claim in case of default is
,
as Figure 2 illustrates. The marginal cost of transferring collateral is shown to be an increasing
function of the share of collateral that is transferred. The parameter  affects the position of the
locus. Higher values of  correspond to a higher marginal cost of collateral transfer.
It is sensible to think of the parameter  as a measure that reﬂects the existence and quality of
measures that govern relationships between borrower and lender. Better governance mechanisms,
such as bankruptcy laws, fast efﬁcient legal systems, and arbitrators, can lower the costs of
transferring collateral and hence lead to lower values of .12
The marginal beneﬁt of transferring an additional unit of collateral is simply the value of an
additional unit of land:
.
12. To the extent that better governance can lower the costs of contracting, one could also think of as
reﬂecting the degree of contractability in ﬁnancial markets.















Figure 2: Governance and the Share of Assets that can be Collateralized
Since the marginal beneﬁt of transferring collateral is independent of the share of collateral
transferred, the marginal beneﬁt curve is illustrated as the horizontal locus in Figure 2. As shown
in the diagram, equilibrium occurs when marginal costs are equated with marginal beneﬁts,
. (4)
As one would expect, better governance, by lowering , leads to a greater value of . In other
words, when the standard of governance is high, the share of physical assets that ﬁrms can
credibly post as collateral is greater. More importantly, note that when  is small,  is relatively
insensitive to shocks that affect property prices and ﬁrms are able to use close to the entire value
of land as collateral. But when is large, the fraction of the land value that can be used is not only
small but highly sensitive to shocks affecting property prices. The implication is that poor
governance can lead to ﬁnancial fragility because the share of capital assets that can be used as
collateral is sensitive to shocks that affect their value when governance is weak.
Together with (4), equation (3) serves to determine the borrowing constraint:
. (5)
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2.2.4 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, the wage must be equal to the value of the marginal product of
labour in the unconstrained sector of the economy. Letting good 1 be the numeraire, equation (1)
implies that the competitively determined wage paid at time  is given by:
.
The corresponding total wage bill for sector 2 ﬁrms is therefore:
. (6)
Under the assumption that the borrowing constraint binds, equations (5) and (6) form a two-




In the case when the borrowing constraint is not binding, the equilibrium condition is replaced by
the usual marginal product of labour condition for sector 2:
. (8)
Assuming that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, as in equation (2a), the




It can be readily determined that (7a) potentially exhibits multiple equilibria if  (Figure 3).
The borrowing constraint, equation (5), is illustrated by the B locus. Its shape can be explained as
follows: when , the marginal product of land is zero, and consequently it has no value.
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As employment rises, the value of land also rises; however, with the assumption that ,
the value of land rises at a diminishing rate.13 The wage bill is given by equation (6). The
marginal product of labour is constant (determined by the market clearing condition in sector 1
that the value of the marginal product equals the wage), and consequently the locus illustrating the
wage bill is linear.
The dynamics of adjustment to equilibrium can be explained as follows: assuming , if
the borrowing constraint is not binding (i.e., ), ﬁrms increase the level of employment,
because the marginal product of labour in this sector exceeds that in sector 1. On the other hand, if
ﬁrms cannot afford to borrow the wage bill, they reduce employment until such time as the
borrowing constraint just binds, or the level of employment reaches zero. As a result, when ,
this model exhibits multiple equilibria.14 In the case shown in Figure 3, there are two stable
13. The beneﬁt of this assumption is that itconstrains the model to focus on sources of ﬁnancial fragility
that arise for reasons other than simply the shape of the production function. Although the properties
of the production function are extremely important,as will be discussed, this assumption eliminates
one source of fragility that arises solelydue to a quirk in the production function speciﬁcation. This
assumption isalso implicit inmany of the standardspeciﬁc functional forms, such as the Cobb-
Douglas production used here, and in this sense it is a relatively weak assumption.
14. The potential for models in which a productive factoris also used to secure loans to generate multiple
















equilibria, at F and G, and one unstable equilibrium, H. F is an equilibrium, because with no
workers employed in sector 2, land has no value. Hence, the marginal beneﬁt of transferring land
is zero and the marginal costs are positive . Consequently, when , ﬁrms are unable
to borrow against their land.
Two special cases should be noted. First, if , then the borrowing constraint passes through
the origin and there is a unique stable equilibria, with . Second, there is some positive
value of , , such that if , then the borrowing constraint does not intersect the wage bill
locus for any value of , and hence there is a unique stable equilibrium at . Assuming
that the production function has the Cobb-Douglas form in equation (2a),  can be determined
by ﬁnding the value of  for which  and substituting this value of  into (7a).
Doing so gives:
.
Clearly,  is strictly positive for .
2.2.5 Financial fragility
Financial fragility can arise in this model for two reasons. First, since the model exhibits multiple
equilibria, it is subject to self-fulﬁlling changes in the equilibrium level of investment, because the
value of land is a function of the level of employment in sector 2. If ﬁrms in the market are
prepared to hire enough workers, then the value of land will be sufﬁciently high to make the
borrowing constraint non-binding, and employment will increase until an equilibrium at G is
reached. However, if, for some reason, ﬁrms in sector 2 plan to employ only a few workers, then
the borrowing constraint will be binding and ﬁrms will not be able to afford to hire even the few
workers they initially attempted to. Employment and output in the industry will fall, further
reducing the value of the land and tightening the borrowing constraint.
This source of fragility is stated formally as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: There is a range of values for , for which there are multiple
equilibria: an unstable equilibrium, , and two stable equilibria—one with
and the other with , . If , then there is a unique equilibrium with
, and if , there is a unique equilibrium with .
Proposition 1 suggests that for values for , the model behaves much like the game of
assurance described earlier. As long as creditors and borrowers are both committed to a high level
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of investment, that equilibrium can be self-sustaining. But a failure to commit to a high level of
investment could lead to a low level of credit and employment in sector 2. Proposition 1 suggests
that government involvement in the relationship to rule out one of the equilibria may be important
in eliminating stability. Similarly, shocks that seem unrelated to economic fundamentals but
important for the creditor-borrower relationship could cause a shift in the equilibrium outcome.
This suggests that government involvement in credit markets (if it helps in relationship and
conﬁdence building) and political or corporate stability may be important determinants of
ﬁnancial stability.
A second source of fragility arises due to “accelerator” properties of the model. Changes in the
model’s parameters, such as the price of, say, good 2, affect the borrowing constraint and change
the equilibrium level of credit and employment. If the borrowing constraint is sensitive to these
parameter changes, then the level of investment can change dramatically. In Figure 3, if the slope
of the borrowing constraint in the neighbourhood of point G is relatively steep, then one could
argue that the equilibrium is “fragile.”
Proposition 2a: From proposition 1, if , then there is a stable equilibrium, with
. This equilibrium is sensitive to changes in the parameters of the model, particularly for
large values of .
Proposition 2a implies that, when governance is weak (i.e., a is high), even small negative shocks
can cause creditors to stop rolling over loans, causing a large fall in employment in sector 2, even
though production in this sector is a positive net present-value activity.
To prove Proposition 2a, deﬁne the “ ” ﬁnancial accelerator as the elasticity of borrowing with
respect to a given parameter, . The size of the “accelerator” can be determined from considering
equations (3), (4), and (7) (which are, respectively, the borrowing constraint, the equilibrium share
of land value that can be used as collateral, and the equilibrium condition equating the borrowing
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By totally differentiating this set of equations and making the necessary substitutions, the
ﬁnancial accelerator can be found:
.
Considering only the equilibrium with a positive level of investment, the properties of the
production function ensure that the denominator of the ﬁrst term is positive.
For concreteness, consider the accelerator for two key parameters,  and . In the case of , the
“terms-of-trade accelerator” is:
;
and the “contractability” accelerator is:
.
The magnitudes of both accelerators are positive functions of . That is, the terms-of-trade
accelerator and the contractability accelerator are greater the greater the value of , because, as
discussed above, the ability to post collateral becomes increasingly fragile as becomes larger. In
the former case, the effect is indirect and arises because the value of  is larger when
 is larger (a larger  results in a smaller ); in the latter case, the effect is both direct and
indirect.
Even more dramatically, a change in the parameter values (say, an increase in the marginal cost of
collateral transfer, or a reduction in the price of good 2) could cause the borrowing constraint to
shift downwards sufﬁciently that it would no longer intersect with the wage ﬁnancing
requirement, resulting in a complete collapse in lending from an equilibrium at G to one at F. This
would involve the “accelerators” approaching inﬁnity. Since the model has multiple equilibria,
however, we arrive at the striking result that, for an economy currently in a stable, positive
investment equilibrium, a small change in parameter values (e.g., an increase in a) could result in
a collapse in investment that cannot be reversed by a reversal in the parameter values. Thus,
countries that experience a shock that leads to a complete collapse in ﬁnancing and investment
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Proposition 2b: Starting from an equilibrium with , and values of  close to , the
ﬁnancial accelerator is inﬁnitely large downwards and zero upwards.
The outcome of Propositions 1 and 2a and b is that governance measures that reduce the costs of
enforcing (implicit or explicit) contracts with borrowers also reduce ﬁnancial fragility. They do so
in three ways: ﬁrst, better governance tends to eliminate the likelihood of multiple equilibria;
second, it reduces the size of ﬁnancial accelerators; and third, it can reduce the likelihood that a
small temporary shock could lead to a drastic and potentially irreversible jump in lending and
investment.
The model presented in this section provides a reasonably simple story that explicitly models the
relationship between governance and ﬁnancial fragility. The story differs somewhat from existing
ones in that it abstracts from capital accumulation (as in Bernanke and Gertler 1989), the
accumulation of land by workers (as in Kiyotaki and Moore 1997), and the role of the banking
system (as in Allen and Gale 2002, for example). Moreover, the model is static. Nevertheless, it
generates some striking results, and provides new insight into the institutional sources of ﬁnancial
fragility. In particular, the results demonstrate that weak governance mechanisms can produce
multiple equilibria and large multiplier effects.
3. Empirical Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodology
As the model developed in the previous section illustrates, agency problems can generate
instability in a market economy. As a result, there is an incentive for societies to develop rules and
institutions to govern economic behaviour in a way that alleviates the impacts of these problems
and allows the market to achieve better outcomes, which in this case would be to alleviate
ﬁnancial fragility.
Financial fragility is difﬁcult to quantify. In this paper, ﬁnancial fragility refers to the extent to
which the ﬁnancial system’s ability to ﬁnance investment is susceptible to failure. Thus, there are
two dimensions to ﬁnancial fragility: the strength of the ﬁnancial system and the ability of the
system to ﬁnance investment. Consequently, this study uses two measures of ﬁnancial fragility:
the incidence of systemic banking crises, and investment volatility as a proxy of the susceptibility
of the ﬁnancial system’s capacity to ﬁnance investment activity.15
15. The measures were chosen because they are in keeping with the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial facility used in
this paper. Systemic banking crises occur when the whole banking system of a country has negative
net worth, or when its capital assets are virtually exhausted. In such circumstances, the ability of the
ﬁnancial investment isconstrained. Investment volatility isused as a proxy of the extent to which the
abilityoftheﬁnancialsystemtocontinuetoﬁnanceinvestmentissusceptibletoshocks.Otherstudies
have used stock market, exchange ratevolatility (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000).
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Banking crises and investment volatility are related. Investment can fall drastically during a
banking crisis. For example, over the period 1990 to 1993, during which Sweden suffered its
banking crisis, investment fell from 25 per cent of GDP to 16 per cent; similarly, as Mexico went
into crisis in 1994/95, investment fell from 21.4 to 14.2 per cent of GDP.16 However, whereas a
country is considered to either be or not to be in crisis, investment volatility is a continuous
measure. Having two distinct measures is a useful means of ensuring that any ﬁndings regarding
the role of governance are reasonably robust to different deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial fragility. The rest
of this section describes three empirical tests that can be used to identify whether governance can
mitigate ﬁnancial fragility. Section 3.2 gives a more detailed description of the data.
The ﬁrst test uses a cross-section of countries to test whether investment volatility is explained by
the level of governance in a particular country. A simple OLS cross-country regression is run:
,
where is the measure of investment volatility for country , is a vector of country-speciﬁc
control variables that are likely to affect volatility, is an indicator of the level of governance in
country, , and  is a country-speciﬁc error term. The controls used are population, average
inﬂation over the 1984–2000 period, average level of domestic credit to the private sector, and
ratio of investment to GDP. Population was used to account for the possibility that countries with
small populations may have relatively undiversiﬁed economies and that therefore investment
volatility could result from sector-speciﬁc shocks. Inﬂation may be important for a number of
reasons, including controlling for the effects of monetary surprises and policy-coordination
problems between ﬁscal and monetary authorities. The size of domestic credit to the private sector
is a proxy for the development of ﬁnancial markets. Better-developed ﬁnancial markets may offer
a variety of options for borrowers, thereby reducing ﬁnancial fragility. Lastly, the level of
investment to GDP accounts for the possibility that the magnitude of investment volatility will be
larger in economies that have higher levels of investment to GDP.
The second test of the effect of governance on ﬁnancial fragility is a simple difference-of-means
test. This test also uses a cross-section of countries that are divided into two categories: those that
experienced at least one crisis between 1984 and 2001, and those that did not. The effect of
governance is tested for using a standard t-test for equality in the sample means for the
governance variable of interest. If governance has a signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood of a
16. Thesamecanbesaidofmanyothercountries.Asimpleordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regressionusing
the data set described below suggests that, in the year following the beginning of a systemic banking
crisis,investmenttoGDPfallsbyabout1.8percent.Theeffectismuchbigger(approximatelydouble)
if additional time lags are allowed for between the crisis and its impact on investment.




banking crisis, then there should be a statistically signiﬁcant difference in governance between the
two groups, with the crisis countries having poorer levels of governance than the non-crisis
countries.
The third set of tests exploits the time-series dimension of the data to estimate what may be
termed a “business cycle model” of banking crises augmented to capture the effects of governance.17
The model is a simple probit model of the following form (similar to that estimated by DKD 2002,
amongst others):
,
where denotes the country, and the time period. In this case, is a binary variable that takes
on a 0 when the banking system of country is not in crisis (i.e., has a positive net-worth position)
and a 1 when the country enters a crisis (ongoing crisis observations are dropped from the model).
As before,  reﬂects a matrix of risk factors, including macroeconomic variables lagged by
 periods. Following DKD, the variables included in the analysis are per-capita GDP, per-capita
GDP growth, inﬂation, ratio of domestic credit to GDP, credit growth, exchange rate appreciation,
size of the money base relative to foreign reserve holdings, size of the current account surplus
relative to GDP, and size of the government budget surplus relative to GDP. The interpretation of
these variables is standard and is discussed in DKD (2002) and Santor (2003). In this test, the
matrix includes a governance risk factor (such as the rule of law) lagged periods. In this
case, the change in, rather than the level of, the governance variable is used as the risk factor, for
two reasons. First, many of the governance variables are highly correlated with income; using the
change in the variable overcomes this collinearity problem.18 Second, the dependent variable,
, can also be thought of as a change variable that takes on the value of 1 when the banking
system moves from a good state to a bad state. Thus, one would expect the likelihood of this
change to depend on the change in the level of governance (e.g., a worsening in the level of law
and order should increase the likelihood of a crisis occurring).
The starting date of a crisis is often difﬁcult to identify (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003); to account
for this fact, a lag of two years is generally used. Using a long lag avoids problems of reverse
causality. For example, it may be that the government’s budget deﬁcit expands during and after a
17. Theterm“businesscyclemodel”comesfromGorton(1988). Heusesthetermtoindicatethatbanking
crises may reﬂect the state of macroeconomic conditions (fundamentals), rather than sunspots.
18. The multicollinearity problem is extreme; the correlation coefﬁcientbetween per-capita income and
many of the governance variables isquite high (often in excess of 0.7). In preliminary analysis that
included per-capita income and a governance variable in the regression, it was found that the
coefﬁcientsand signiﬁcance of both the per-capita income and governance variable were extremely
sensitive to the measure of governanceused and the sample period.
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banking crisis, as the government increases spending on bailing out the banking system; using a
contemporaneous measure, it may seem that this large deﬁcit is the cause of the crisis rather than
the result of one. Although the business cycle model attempts to capture some of the dynamic
aspects of the data, one of its drawbacks is that it limits the analysis to using governance data
where annual observations are available, thereby reducing the richness of the analysis in terms of
the available sources of data.
3.2 The data set
3.2.1 Measuring ﬁnancial fragility
The data on banking crises are from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). This data set covers systemic
banking crises in industrialized and developing countries from the early 1980s through 2002,
though only crises from 1984 to 2001 were included in the analysis. Other data sets on banking
crises have been used in the literature, but this one was preferred because it is comprehensive and
the most up to date.19 This set of crises reﬂects a situation in which much or all of a given
country’s bank capital has been exhausted. As such, it reﬂects a situation in which the banking
system’s ability to ﬁnance new or ongoing investment activities is severely curtailed. A country
that has a high probability of such systemic crises is likely to be ﬁnancially fragile, in the sense
used in this paper.
The data on investment volatility are derived from the investment-to-GDP ratio from the Penn
World Tables, version 6.1. To derive a measure of volatility, the following regression was run for
each country over the period 1980–2000:
,
where is the investment-to-GDP variable for the country in period , is a time trend,
is the per-capita-to-GDP ratio, and e is an unobserved error term. Using the residuals from each
country regression, the resulting root-mean-squared error (RMSE) is taken as a measure of
investment volatility.
19. Previous studies,such as DKD (2002), have found their results to be robustto different data sets,
including the Caprio and Klingebiel data set.
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3.2.2 Institutional accounting
The governance variables come from the following sources: the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) Political Risk Rating table; the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ) World Bank
Governance Data set (1999); the Economic Freedom of the World (EFOW) data set (Gwartney et
al. 2002); and the Polity IV Project data set (2000). The ICRG Political Risk Guide consists of 12
components, of which six (government stability, investment proﬁle, corruption, law and order,
democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality) are used in this study as measures of various
aspects of governance. Each of these six variables is an index, with higher scores representing
“better” institutional outcomes. Annual observations from 1984 (when the ICRG data set begins)
through 2001 were used, except in the cross-section analysis, where the simple average over the
whole sample was used for each of the variables. The variables and sources are described in more
detail in the data appendix.
The KKZ data set also provides data on institutional outcomes for six categories of governance.
The data are derived by combining information from a variety of sources, not just one survey. As
a result it is very comprehensive. Unfortunately, data are available only for the years 1997 and
2001, of which only the 1997 data are used. Although this study examines banking crises from the
period 1984 to 2001, these once-off governance data are used to indicate the nature of the
institutions in those countries at the time of the crisis. Implicitly, it is assumed that institutions are
relatively stable over time. The variables are standardized normal, with high values corresponding
to better governance.
The EFOW data are used in this study primarily to examine the role of government intervention in
the economy. Observations are used from 1985 onwards, at 5-year intervals, on government
ownership of banks, government transfers and subsidies, real interest rate controls, and price
controls. The measures used are indexes that take values from 1 to 10, with high values
corresponding to less government interference. Unfortunately, the number of countries in the
EFOW data set is somewhat smaller than that of the other data sets used, and using this data set in
the analysis reduces the sample size. Rather than limit the size of the data set for the whole study,
results generated using this data set rely on a smaller number of observations, and the potential
inconsistency with the analysis using the rest of the data set is noted.
Data on the government ownership of banks are from two sources. The ﬁrst set of variables
measures ownership and control of banks and was collected by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2002), henceforth LLS, for their study of government-owned banks. These variables
measure the share of the assets of the top 10 banks in a given country that are government-owned20
(gb_per) or -controlled (gc20, gc50, gc90 when the state is the largest shareholder and controls at
least 20, 50, or 90 per cent of bank assets, respectively). The second measure of government
ownership or control is taken from the EFOW database (Gwartney et al. 2002). This variable, gob,
uses an index (1–10) to measure the percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, where
10 corresponds to between 0 and 5 per cent and 1 corresponds to between 100 and 90 per cent.
Again, the data on government-owned banks cover a subset of countries and therefore there may
be a problem when comparing the analysis done with these variables with other institutional
variables. This fact is noted when it occurs, and it is left to the reader to decide what weight to
place on comparisons with analysis using other variables.
The last source of institutional data is the Polity IV Project data set. These variables are primarily
used to examine the role of democracy and constraints on political power. Five variables from the
Polity IV data set are used: indexes of democracy, autocracy, polity (a linear combination of the
democracy and autocracy indexes), executive constraints, and competition in political participation.
In addition, democratic accountability, from the ICRG data set, voice and accountability, from
KKZ (1999), and political rights, from LLS (2002), are also used to measure the extent of
democracy and constraints on political power.
To account for business cycle aspects, macroeconomic data were collected on per-capita GDP and
growth, domestic credit, current account, government budget, exchange rates, and money supply.
These data are available from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Together, this generates a panel of 97 countries for the period 1984 to 2001.20 As discussed above,
the data are used both in a panel and as a cross-section. Table 1 summarizes the cross-section of
institutional data used in the analysis of banking crises.21
4. Governance and Financial Fragility: Empirical Findings
This section describes the results of each of the three aforementioned tests and discusses the
effectiveness of the different types of governance mechanisms in mitigating fragility. As stated
above, the ﬁrst test involves a simple regression of investment volatility for each country on a set
of controls and a governance measure. Tables 2a to c list the coefﬁcient, t-statistic, and statistical
signiﬁcance associated with each variable. The second test uses the banking crises data to divide
20. Countries in transition are notincluded. All experienced banking crises and are fullyexplained by a
“transitioneconomy”dummy;theyarethereforedroppedfromtheanalysis.Thisisnotunusualinthe
literature (DKD 2002 also make this assumption).
21. There are some gaps in the data set, however, and some variables were not available for all countries.
Thus, there may be some variation inthe number of countries used in any one of the tests.2
1






























































Algeria 1.00 52.81 1.63 3.31 2.75 2.31 7.94 6.06 -1.31 -2.421 -1.087 -1.173 -1.103 -0.878
Argentina 1.00 66.88 2.19 3.38 4.44 3.88 6.56 5.69 0.486 0.507 0.262 0.668 0.319 -0.275
Australia 0.00 82.06 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 7.75 6.56 1.626 1.184 1.459 0.962 1.596 1.601
Austria 0.00 86.00 3.88 4.81 5.38 6.00 8.38 8.31 1.446 1.377 1.219 0.901 1.812 1.457
Bahamas 0.00 70.81 3.00 1.81 4.00 4.00 6.44 7.88 1.134 0.372 0.474 0.87 0.563 0.497
Bahrain 0.00 59.56 2.69 3.31 1.63 4.63 7.19 6.44 -1.037 -0.077 0.235 0.752 0.665 -0.215
Bangladesh 1.00 44.69 0.69 1.13 3.50 1.88 4.81 4.81 -0.015 -0.398 -0.565 -0.155 -0.929 -0.289
Belgium 0.00 79.69 4.00 4.69 5.50 5.81 7.50 7.88 1.414 0.818 0.883 0.794 0.797 0.672
Bolivia 1.00 52.63 0.63 2.19 3.44 1.88 6.25 6.00 0.391 -0.143 -0.223 0.876 -0.355 -0.438
Botswana 0.00 70.25 2.50 3.63 3.88 4.75 7.81 8.06 0.779 0.743 0.221 0.572 0.502 0.535
Brazil 1.00 65.31 2.81 3.63 3.50 3.38 6.44 5.56 0.582 -0.323 -0.22 0.134 -0.222 0.058
Cameroon 1.00 51.13 2.63 2.50 2.50 2.81 7.00 5.94 -0.703 -0.724 -0.645 -0.164 -1.015 -1.105
Canada 0.00 83.44 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.75 7.63 1.389 1.027 1.717 0.869 1.549 2.055
Chile 1.00 64.19 2.25 3.25 3.63 4.38 6.88 7.06 0.617 0.451 1.166 0.898 1.086 1.029
Colombia 1.00 56.19 2.81 2.69 3.75 1.38 6.50 5.69 -0.154 -1.29 -0.057 0.29 -0.783 -0.49
Congo Dem. R. 1.00 30.97 0.75 0.25 1.31 0.94 4.06 3.56 -1.567 -2.586 -1.769 -2.34 -2.153 -1.556
Congo Rep Of 1.00 51.00 1.00 3.20 3.00 2.00 6.67 4.63 -0.773 -1.826 -0.58 -0.991 -1.435 -0.596
Costa Rica 1.00 70.25 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 7.13 6.56 1.345 0.908 0.554 0.927 0.553 0.577
Cote d'Ivoire 1.00 62.43 2.81 3.00 3.00 3.38 5.56 6.25 -0.569 -0.138 -0.18 0.148 -0.335 -0.079
Cyprus 0.00 65.88 3.34 3.94 4.19 3.94 7.94 8.50 1.115 0.381 1.041 0.84 0.928 1.811
(continued)2































































Denmark 0.00 86.31 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.38 7.31 1.634 1.286 1.721 1.048 1.691 2.129
Dominican Rep. 0.00 58.56 1.81 3.25 3.88 3.44 6.13 5.88 -0.078 0.121 -0.833 0.539 0.38 -0.773
Ecuador 1.00 59.63 2.00 3.06 4.00 3.88 6.75 5.06 0.268 -0.467 -0.562 0.377 -0.721 -0.819
Egypt 0.00 55.19 2.00 2.50 3.56 3.06 7.50 6.06 -0.674 -0.067 -0.138 0.118 0.128 -0.267
El Salvador 1.00 50.13 0.56 2.69 2.81 2.06 5.88 5.31 -0.1 -0.021 -0.262 1.233 -0.656 -0.354
Finland 1.00 87.81 3.97 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.69 7.88 1.632 1.514 1.635 1.14 1.736 2.085
France 0.00 79.38 3.97 4.88 5.56 5.25 7.69 7.56 1.147 0.647 1.28 0.713 1.077 1.282
Gabon 0.00 60.31 2.81 1.50 3.13 2.63 6.69 5.94 -0.314 -0.561 -1.127 0.355 -0.525 -1.015
Germany 0.00 83.88 4.00 5.13 5.44 5.63 8.06 8.06 1.462 1.317 1.409 0.889 1.483 1.62
Ghana 1.00 56.63 2.13 2.75 2.06 2.38 7.31 6.50 -0.435 -0.101 -0.287 0.278 -0.014 -0.301
Greece 0.00 68.38 2.63 4.75 4.25 4.13 6.75 5.81 1.054 0.205 0.56 0.605 0.496 0.825
Guatemala 0.00 48.94 0.56 2.50 3.06 1.75 6.06 5.50 -0.565 -0.751 -0.225 0.444 -1.106 -0.819
Guinea-Bissau 1.00 45.07 1.00 2.00 1.07 1.00 5.00 5.53 -0.454 -1.203 -0.334 -1.35 -1.615 -0.176
Guyana 0.00 54.31 1.06 1.81 3.06 2.25 5.94 5.88 1.01 -0.195 0.009 0.234 -0.14 -0.019
Haiti 0.00 36.38 0.00 1.31 1.56 1.56 3.88 2.50 -0.709 -1.709 -1.232 -1.133 -1.495 -0.535
Honduras 0.00 49.44 1.00 2.00 2.88 2.31 6.06 5.94 -0.055 -0.334 -0.409 0.081 -0.895 -0.938
Hong Kong 0.00 69.31 2.81 4.63 2.38 4.94 6.25 6.56 0.013 0.922 1.248 1.207 1.333 1.313
Iceland 0.00 85.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.38 6.31 1.472 1.252 1.504 0.614 1.469 1.831
India 0.00 52.94 3.00 2.81 4.06 2.94 6.38 5.94 0.364 -0.037 -0.264 -0.04 0.16 -0.306
Indonesia 1.00 51.75 1.06 1.63 2.88 2.88 7.13 6.31 -1.131 -1.289 -0.528 0.121 -0.918 -0.799
Ireland 0.00 80.75 3.78 4.50 5.69 5.00 8.19 7.69 1.526 1.426 1.361 1.157 1.395 1.567
Israel 0.00 55.56 3.47 4.63 5.19 3.69 6.56 6.31 1.06 -0.455 0.685 0.533 0.966 1.277
Italy 0.00 75.56 3.25 3.69 4.75 5.31 6.75 6.88 1.281 1.159 0.773 0.591 0.861 0.802
Jamaica 1.00 66.56 2.38 2.44 4.19 2.44 6.69 6.31 0.75 -0.344 -0.484 0.76 -0.728 -0.116
Japan 1.00 84.00 3.97 4.56 5.81 5.50 7.63 7.75 1.138 1.153 0.839 0.389 1.422 0.724
(continued)2
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Jordan 0.00 58.38 2.19 3.50 3.31 3.31 7.75 6.00 0.153 -0.057 0.63 0.417 0.708 0.139
Kenya 1.00 57.50 2.75 2.81 3.19 3.44 6.31 6.19 -0.701 -1.098 -0.899 -0.133 -1.22 -0.651
Kuwait 0.00 58.63 1.88 2.81 2.44 3.88 7.19 6.69 0 0.684 -0.063 -0.091 0.907 0.619
Luxembourg 0.00 92.13 3.97 5.81 6.00 6.00 10.50 9.31 1.489 1.398 1.674 0.947 1.621 1.671
Madagascar 1.00 57.94 1.44 4.00 3.88 3.25 6.31 5.56 0.309 -0.786 -0.295 -0.209 -0.825 -0.469
Malawi 0.00 57.56 1.19 3.44 2.31 2.75 5.50 6.38 0.062 0.039 -0.625 0.081 -0.409 -0.195
Malaysia 1.00 69.19 2.50 4.00 4.31 4.19 7.69 6.81 -0.093 0.552 0.714 0.477 0.834 0.633
Mali 1.00 48.56 0.00 1.94 2.06 2.50 5.94 5.19 0.415 -0.287 -0.052 0.29 -0.465 -0.476
Malta 0.00 72.43 2.43 3.64 4.64 4.36 8.21 7.57 1.413 1.318 0.629 0.386 0.864 0.497
Mexico 1.00 67.94 2.06 2.81 4.00 2.94 7.44 6.81 -0.107 -0.352 0.179 0.608 -0.474 -0.277
Morocco 0.00 59.00 2.19 2.81 2.25 3.88 8.50 6.31 -0.24 0.09 0.267 0.216 0.678 0.125
Namibia 0.00 72.50 2.90 4.00 4.10 5.10 8.50 7.00 0.473 0.714 0.044 0.267 0.954 0.382
Netherlands 0.00 87.81 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.44 8.00 1.638 1.479 2.03 1.141 1.584 2.026
New Zealand 0.00 85.06 4.00 5.75 5.88 6.00 7.50 7.69 1.467 1.416 1.571 1.205 1.824 2.075
Nicaragua 1.00 50.06 1.00 4.69 3.63 2.88 6.75 4.31 0.069 -0.323 -0.547 -0.103 -0.726 -0.836
Niger 1.00 49.20 1.80 2.60 3.13 2.67 5.73 4.73 -0.744 -0.763 -1.387 -0.523 -1.144 -1.567
Nigeria 1.00 48.25 1.44 1.88 2.25 2.13 6.63 5.63 -1.234 -1.054 -1.321 -0.352 -1.097 -0.954
Norway 1.00 85.00 3.72 5.75 6.00 6.00 7.69 7.06 1.674 1.414 1.666 0.932 1.833 1.687
Oman 0.00 65.19 2.38 3.00 2.25 4.13 7.94 7.06 -0.57 0.912 0.9 0.305 1.077 0.484
Panama 1.00 54.06 0.75 2.00 3.06 2.44 5.56 5.50 0.665 0.149 -0.277 1.002 -0.392 -0.458
Pap. New Guinea 0.00 60.56 2.81 3.13 4.81 3.38 6.25 5.44 0.121 -0.398 -0.694 -0.129 -0.307 -0.854
Paraguay 1.00 60.19 0.88 1.38 2.38 3.06 6.38 7.13 -0.419 -0.571 -1.1 0.37 -0.695 -0.958
Peru 1.00 48.50 1.19 3.00 2.50 1.94 6.00 5.63 -0.687 -0.529 0.173 0.669 -0.522 -0.2
Philippines 1.00 52.88 1.13 2.38 4.31 2.44 5.88 5.25 0.632 0.273 0.126 0.565 -0.078 -0.228
Portugal 0.00 76.63 2.56 4.75 5.06 5.19 7.88 6.88 1.483 1.385 1.151 0.889 1.083 1.218
(continued)2
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Note: See Data Appendix for sources and descriptions.































































Senegal 1.00 56.75 1.81 3.00 3.56 2.31 7.38 6.56 -0.292 -0.871 0.047 -0.338 -0.097 -0.235
Sierra Leone 1.00 39.50 1.00 1.94 1.81 2.69 4.88 3.06 -1.623 -1.519 0.009 -1.501 -0.906 -0.019
Singapore 0.00 80.88 3.59 4.50 2.88 5.38 8.75 7.63 0.126 1.386 2.082 1.245 1.939 1.948
South Africa 0.00 63.94 3.56 4.94 4.63 2.50 7.31 6.81 0.992 -0.527 -0.01 0.244 -0.351 0.299
South Korea 1.00 70.60 3.19 3.38 3.69 3.50 7.81 7.19 0.909 0.164 0.409 0.219 0.943 0.159
Spain 1.00 72.81 3.06 4.25 5.31 4.75 7.81 8.19 1.356 0.58 1.603 0.864 1.032 1.214
Sri Lanka 1.00 45.75 2.00 3.25 4.31 1.75 5.50 6.06 -0.157 -1.628 -0.612 0.616 -0.361 -0.124
Sweden 1.00 85.25 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.06 7.13 1.601 1.411 1.573 0.853 1.623 2.085
Switzerland 0.00 89.56 4.00 5.75 6.00 6.00 9.56 8.19 1.68 1.69 1.986 0.878 1.996 2.072
Tanzania 1.00 59.63 0.56 3.19 2.94 4.06 6.94 5.81 -0.283 0.565 -0.485 0.183 0.161 -0.924
Thailand 1.00 62.63 3.06 2.88 3.19 4.25 6.88 6.31 0.222 0.246 0.01 0.192 0.413 -0.165
Togo 1.00 47.31 0.81 2.00 1.63 2.38 6.00 5.88 -1.051 -0.906 -0.374 -0.853 -0.799 -0.242
Trinidad & Tob 0.00 62.69 2.19 2.81 3.00 4.00 6.88 6.56 0.953 0.315 0.521 0.718 0.514 0.511
Tunisia 0.00 61.88 2.00 3.00 2.69 3.44 7.69 6.50 -0.589 0.661 0.633 0.429 0.648 0.02
Uganda 1.00 44.88 0.75 2.44 1.81 2.38 6.75 5.81 -0.517 -0.98 -0.251 0.184 -0.013 -0.466
United Kingdom 0.00 81.81 4.00 5.19 5.69 5.31 7.50 7.94 1.506 0.92 1.966 1.206 1.689 1.707
United States 0.00 83.38 4.00 4.75 6.00 6.00 8.25 8.31 1.523 1.096 1.366 1.135 1.254 1.407
Uruguay 1.00 64.81 1.31 3.00 4.19 3.00 6.75 7.06 0.77 0.348 0.618 0.949 0.27 0.43
Venezuela 1.00 65.75 1.81 3.00 4.94 4.00 7.13 5.38 0.153 -0.25 -0.849 0.09 -0.662 -0.725
Zambia 1.00 56.69 1.00 2.75 3.19 2.81 5.44 6.06 -0.046 -0.002 -0.399 0.252 -0.402 -0.614
Zimbabwe 1.00 56.31 2.63 3.13 2.81 3.00 6.44 5.06 -0.666 -0.542 -1.129 -0.341 -0.146 -0.319
(continued)2
5
Table 1:  Crisis Countries and Institutional Variables (continued)











Algeria 2 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.74 0.00 2.18 0.00
Argentina 6 0 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 7.47 3.75 8.00 5.00
Australia 7 1 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.04 6.81 10.00 6.55 9.38
Austria 7 0 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.00 3.71 9.38 6.64 5.19
Bahamas 7 1 ....9.73 10.00 4.00 10.00
Bahrain 2 1 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 9.63 9.09 4.00 8.00
Bangladesh 5 1 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.90 . 8.13 0.00 0.13
Belgium 7 0 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.17 2.99 10.00 3.73 10.00
Bolivia 6 0 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 9.45 5.50 7.18 9.09
Botswana 6 1 ....8.21 6.25 6.00 5.00
Brazil 6 0 0.32 0.57 0.23 0.14 6.98 0.50 3.36 5.00
Cameroon 1 0 ....9.69 6.00 0.00 0.75
Canada 7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.74 10.00 8.09 10.00
Chile 6 0 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 6.86 8.75 9.83 8.00
Colombia 4 0 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 9.01 8.00 5.17 8.00
Congo Dem. R. 1 0 ....9.74 0.00 2.00 0.00
Congo Rep. Of 4 .....9.34 6.63 0.00 0.00
Costa Rica 7 0 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 8.39 7.38 6.18 10.00
Cote d'Ivoire 2 0 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.14 9.46 7.25 1.09 4.25
Cyprus 7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.66 9.38 1.09 8.00
Denmark 7 0 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 3.85 10.00 7.91 10.00
Dominican Rep. 4 0 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 9.60 4.36 5.09 9.38
Ecuador 6 0 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 9.46 2.25 2.18 6.69
Egypt 2 0 0.89 0.96 0.86 0.81 7.39 7.50 2.18 5.00
El Salvador 5 0 0.26 0.39 0.39 0.14 9.56 8.75 5.27 .
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Finland 7 0 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 5.18 10.00 7.64 8.00
France 7 0 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.05 2.84 8.75 7.09 10.00
Gabon 3 0 ....9.67 6.63 1.09 2.50
Germany 7 0 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.30 4.80 10.00 8.91 5.00
Ghana 4 1 ....9.48 2.38 2.36 3.13
Greece 7 0 0.78 0.85 0.84 0.69 5.19 7.50 3.18 4.06
Guatemala 4 0 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 9.80 7.88 6.18 8.00
Guinea-Bissau 5 0 ..... 0.18 3.27 .
G u y a n a6 1 ..... 4.67 . .
Haiti 3 0 ....8.15 0.55 1.09 .
Honduras 5 0 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 9.37 6.75 4.00 .
Hong Kong 4 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.87 10.00 9.45 10.00
Iceland 7 0 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 7.35 7.38 6.33 2.19
India 4 1 0.85 1.00 0.95 0.60 8.50 8.00 3.55 0.75
Indonesia 1 0 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 9.56 8.00 4.73 3.13
Ireland 7 1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 5.08 9.88 8.09 8.00
Israel 7 1 0.65 0.80 0.82 0.00 5.10 5.00 5.00 0.00
Italy 7 0 0.36 0.28 0.28 0.17 2.72 8.75 5.55 5.00
Jamaica 6 1 ....9.58 6.00 4.00 8.44
Japan 7 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.99 9.88 5.55 5.00
Jordan 4 0 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.22 9.12 5.45 2.00 5.00
Kenya 1 1 0.30 0.49 0.22 0.09 9.15 8.00 3.27 4.06
Kuwait 3 0 0.33 0.46 0.32 0.18 7.44 10.00 6.00 5.00
Luxembourg 7 0 ....3.11 10.00 3.82 10.00
Madagascar 6 0 ....9.80 0.73 0.00 0.75
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Malawi 6 1 ....9.50 5.88 2.18 2.00
Malaysia 4 1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 9.22 10.00 4.36 5.00
Mali 6 0 ....9.74 6.63 2.18 2.00
Malta 7 0 ....6.05 7.50 1.09 0.00
Mexico 4 0 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 8.61 6.50 2.91 3.00
Morocco 3 0 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.24 9.12 7.38 2.18 5.00
Namibia 6 1 ....9.18 7.27 3.09 .
Netherlands 7 0 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 2.02 10.00 7.09 9.38
New Zealand 7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.75 9.38 9.55 8.44
Nicaragua 4 0 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 8.42 2.38 2.18 .
Niger 5 0 ..... 6.73 2.18 3.13
Nigeria 1 1 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.08 9.78 1.50 0.36 3.13
Norway 7 0 0.44 0.87 0.62 0.08 3.78 10.00 6.64 8.63
Oman 2 0 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.24 9.48 10.00 4.00 8.00
Panama 6 0 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 8.41 10.00 3.09 8.00
Pap New Guinea 6 1 ....9.34 8.33 . 5.00
Paraguay 4 0 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 9.51 5.27 5.09 .
Peru 3 0 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.24 9.33 2.38 4.36 8.00
Philippines 6 0 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.18 9.95 7.50 4.00 7.06
Portugal 7 0 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.24 5.76 9.38 5.55 1.56
Senegal 4 0 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.20 9.77 6.00 1.27 2.00
Sierra Leone 1 1 ....9.56 0.75 4.18 2.00
Singapore 3 1 0.14 0.34 0.05 0.00 9.56 10.00 8.55 10.00
South Africa 7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.77 8.75 6.17 10.00
South Korea 6 0 0.25 0.42 0.22 0.13 9.40 10.00 0.09 5.00
(continued)2
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                   Note: See Data Appendix for sources and descriptions.
Table 1: Crisis Countries and Institutional Variables (concluded)











Spain 7 0 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 5.46 10.00 6.45 8.00
Sri Lanka 4 1 0.71 0.76 0.69 0.69 8.62 8.50 4.00 5.00
Sweden 7 0 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.12 2.05 10.00 7.18 8.00
Switzerland 7 0 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.10 5.77 10.00 6.55 5.00
Tanzania 3 1 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 8.72 2.75 2.18 0.00
Thailand 5 1 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.00 9.82 9.38 4.36 7.81
T o g o 2 0 ....9.48 7.88 1.09 2.00
Trinidad & Tobago 7 1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 7.28 6.88 5.09 8.00
Tunisia 2 0 0.37 0.82 0.37 0.03 8.04 7.38 5.09 4.06
Uganda 3 1 ..... 1.75 2.36 2.00
United Kingdom 7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 10.00 8.91 10.00
United States 7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.58 10.00 8.91 10.00
Uruguay 6 0 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 6.48 7.25 5.09 5.00
Venezuela 5 0 0.58 0.63 0.53 0.53 8.72 1.38 0.83 8.00
Zambia 5 1 ....9.17 0.50 1.09 3.13
Zimbabwe 3 1 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.07 8.16 7.88 3.09 3.132
9
                       Note: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 2a: Investment Volatility and Law and Order
Dependent Variable: Investment Volatility
Law and order
(ICRG)





































































n 8 88 58 58 59 6
Adj R-sq 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.09 0.06
R-sq 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.113
0
Note: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 2b: Investment Volatility and Government Involvement in the Economy
(Government Control of Banking System)






































































n 6 66 66 66 6 8 9
Adj R-sq 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
R-sq 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
(continued)3
1
Note: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 2b:  Investment Volatility and Government Involvement in the Economy (continued)


































































n 8 59 28 59 1 9 6
Adj R-sq 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14
R-sq 0.15 .18 0.17 0.17 0.18
(continued)3
2
Note: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 2b: Investment Volatility and Government Involvement in the Economy (concluded)






















































































n9 0 8 5 9 7 9 5 8 5 9 1
Adj R-sq 0.18 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.14
R-sq 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.193
3
Note: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Table 2c: Investment Volatility and Democracy and Accountability



























































































































n 8 09 48 09 49 48 59 7 9 7
Adj R-sq 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.08
R-sq 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.1234
the countries into two groups—those that experienced a crisis during the period 1984–2001 and
those that did not—and performs a simple t-test to determine the difference in the mean value of
each institutional treatment variable. The results are given in the second column of Table 3. The
results from the third set of tests, which exploit the time dimension of the panel and account for
business cycle effects, are provided in the third column of Table 3. Table 4 provides benchmark
results for the business cycle model without the governance variable. This benchmark equation
has also been estimated by other authors (DKD 2002 and Santor 2003). The results presented in
this equation are quite consistent with the ﬁndings of the other authors.22
To aid in the presentation of the results, the governance mechanisms are classiﬁed into three broad
categories: law and order, government regulation and control, and democracy and constraints on
executive power. The ﬁrst category reﬂects mechanisms that permit the functioning of an “arms-
length system” by enforcing property rights and increasing the ability of agents to rely on
contracts. The second category reﬂects the mechanisms that involve a more interventionist
approach by government. The third reﬂects the view that governments play an important role in
the operation and functioning of the ﬁnancial system, and that constraints on their power can
inﬂuence the outcome in ﬁnancial markets.
4.1 Law and order
It is widely assumed that a society can reduce agency problems and improve contractability by
providing a clearly identiﬁable, mutually acknowledged higher authority that recognizes and
enforces property rights. The ﬁrst category of variables examines this aspect of governance using
the ICRG law, order and investment proﬁle variables, and KKZ rule-of-law variable. Tables 2 and
3 reveal that institutions that promote the rule of law seem to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect
on ﬁnancial fragility. In the case of investment volatility, the ICRG law and order and investor
protection, the KKZ rule of law, and the EFOW property rights and judicial system variables all
have the expected sign and are statistically and quantitatively signiﬁcant. For example,
Argentina’s investment volatility score is 0.967 and its ICRG law and order score is 3.9. If it had
invested in governance institutions that promoted the rule of law, to raise its law and order score to
match that of Spain (4.6), the empirical results suggest that Argentina would have reduced its
investment volatility by 0.30 points (-0.44 x 0.7), or by about 30 per cent!
22. The coefﬁcient on the budget surplus variable has the oppositesign of that found by Santor (2003).
There are a number of possible reasons for this difference; for example, Santor’s ﬁndings may reﬂect
reverse causality (large deﬁcitsare associated withcrises as governments are forced to bail out the
banking system). There may be other reasons; in private correspondence, Santor suggests that other
possibilities may include some sort of multicollinearity problem with the current account surplus,
owing tothe twin-deﬁcits phenomena. Alternatively, this result may simply be data-set speciﬁc.35
Table 3: Banking Crises and Governance
Explanatory variable Difference in means



















































gc20 0.45 0.31 -1.96,
0.05
n/a
gc50 0.40 0.28 -1.8,
0.07
n/a












Table 3: Banking Crises and Governance (continued)
Difference in means






























































Table 3: Banking Crises and Governance (concluded)
Difference in means






























































pright 4.4 5.6 2.8,
0.01
n/a










Table 4: DKD Business Cycle Model Probit Regression Results
(robust estimation)





































Similar results hold for banking crises. The simple t-tests reveal that all the law and order
measures have the predicted sign and that they are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent
level. This supports the view that institutions that establish and enforce property rights play an
important part in mitigating crises. These ﬁndings are also consistent with the ﬁndings of previous
researchers (DKD 1998; Santor 2003).
Legal origin may also play an important role (LLSV 1998). Contracts are often difﬁcult to write
because not every contingency can be covered. In this sense, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that
the law can offer a “helping hand.” They argue that, in countries that have a common-law system,
the courts are more likely to honour “the spirit rather than the letter of the contract,” thus enabling
the contracts to offer more investor protection. If so, common-law systems are more likely to
reduce agency problems. On the other hand, the ﬂexibility of the system may provide “wiggle
room” for a cunning entrepreneur—especially if the judicial system is easily corruptible.
The results on legal origin are mixed. In the investment-volatility regression, the common-law
dummy suggests that non-common-law countries experience less investment volatility, but the
variable is not statistically signiﬁcant. The cross-section banking crisis results, however, tend to
favour the former view. Approximately 28 per cent of the crisis countries were common-law
countries, compared with about half of the non-crisis countries. This difference is statistically
signiﬁcant, but only at the 10 per cent level.
4.2 Government regulation and control
4.2.1 Government ownership of banks
There are a variety of reasons why government regulation and control of the ﬁnancial sector may
eliminate ﬁnancial fragility. For example, in the model developed in the previous section, the
government may have a role to play in eliminating multiple equilibria and thereby ensuring one
aspect of stability. Recall that, when there are multiple equilibria, the model behaves much like
the game of assurance. In this case, the government could solve the commitment problem by
committing itself to funding a minimum level of investment. Via its inﬂuence over government-
owned or -controlled banks, a government could eliminate the low-investment, low-credit
equilibrium and hence eliminate a source of instability. Moreover, it is possible that the
government may be better inclined than private banks to solve some agency problems. According
to this view, government ownership and control should reduce the propensity for ﬁnancial crisis.40
On the other hand, government ownership and control of banks may exacerbate the agency
problem,23 for a number of reasons. First, government-owned banks may be corrupted from their
benevolent activities by self-interested government ofﬁcials and the interests of borrowers.24
Second, the propensity of government-owned banks to fund investment projects on the basis of
political motives, rather than purely economic ones, is another important factor that may increase
the cost to borrowers of securing a return on their deposits.
To test these hypotheses, variables measuring the government ownership of banks are included in
the analysis. Because the data are difﬁcult to collect, the sample of countries is smaller than for
other institutional variables. The results from the investment-volatility equations are not
supportive of the view that government ownership of banks has any effect on fragility. The
variables from LLS (2002) on the government ownership of banks suggest that more government
ownership is correlated with less volatility, whereas the EFOW deposits with government-owned
banks (gob) (measured as 1 minus the share of deposits at private banks) suggest the opposite.
None of the variables is statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, countries that had banking
crises were more likely to have greater government ownership of banks, or a greater share of
deposits at government-owned banks. The t-statistics are all statistically signiﬁcant. These results
are not supportive of the view that government-owned and -controlled banks are able to reduce
agency costs and eliminate fragility. Rather, they suggest the opposite, at least with respect to
banking crises. Unfortunately, there are no annual data on government ownership of banks to use
in estimating the business cycle model.
4.2.2 Other government regulations and control
Other forms of government regulation and control may also be important for reducing agency
costs. For example, governments may be able to ensure that borrowers commit themselves to
repaying through direct controls and regulations in the economy. By limiting competition, these
controls can potentially create substantial rents for ﬁrms favoured by the government. The threat
of losing these rents can inﬂuence ﬁrm behaviour. Lam (2002), for example, argues that such
economic and political suasion was important in preventing Hong Kong from experiencing a
speculative attack on its currency during the Asian crisis. These regulations and controls may also
be important in ensuring that ﬁrms and governments are able to maintain strong relationships. To
23. LLS (2002) summarize the arguments for and against government ownership of banks.
24. So, too,may the owners and managers of private banks, but they may be more disciplinedby proﬁt
motives and the inﬂuence of shareholders. Senior government ofﬁcials may also see themselves as
“above the law” if theyhave inﬂuence in the workings of the judicial system. The disciplining
inﬂuence of democracy is considered in section 4.2.3.41
the extent that governments use these sources of economic power to mitigate agency problems,
variables capturing these effects should be negatively correlated with the likelihood of a crisis. On
the other hand, as discussed earlier, governments may easily abuse their power or be corrupted by
the interests of private ﬁrms. Backman (2001) provides a detailed account of the extent of
government connections to the ﬁnance arms of a number of Asian conglomerates. His analysis
suggests that cronyism is rife among some governments in East Asia, with government
connections playing an important role in the operation of business and the diversion of depositor
funds. Furthermore, regulations and controls can distort economic decisions. In either case,
increased incidence of government control and regulation would increase the likelihood of a
crisis.25
For investment volatility, the results suggest that transfers and subsidies smooth investment,
which is statistically signiﬁcant (a higher value of the transfers and subsidies variable corresponds
to a lower ratio of government transfers and subsidies to GDP). Regulatory measures, though,
indicate the opposite result. The signs on the variables measuring controls on foreign transactions,
interest rate controls, price controls, and general regulatory burden (again, higher values
correspond to less government involvement) all suggest that greater interference in the economy
adds to investment volatility; with the effects of real interest rate controls and the KKZ regulatory
burden, the measures are statistically signiﬁcant. In the case of banking crises, the results show a
consistent pattern: greater interference in the economy via transfers and subsidies, international
controls, interest rate controls, price controls, and just general regulatory burden. All increase the
likelihood of a crisis and all are statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that government
interference is more likely to exacerbate agency problems than to solve them, although the use of
transfers and subsidies may be able to smooth investment. Annual observations of direct
government intervention were not available and so there are no results from the business cycle
model.
It is reasonable to assume that a good bureaucracy is capable of providing quality services,
supervision, and regulation. As such, higher levels of bureaucratic quality are likely to be
associated with less investment volatility and reduced likelihood of a banking crisis. The quality
of the bureaucracy is measured by two variables: the ICRG bureaucratic quality variable (bq), and
the KKZ government effectiveness variable (ge). According to the results shown Table 2c, both
suggest that better bureaucracies are consistent with less investment volatility, with both having
25. Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that such controls that encourage relationships are ﬁne in
economies, as long as there are plenty of high-return investment opportunities, but problematic when
there is poor institutional infrastructure (law and order/investor protection) and limited opportunities
for investment.42
the expected sign and both being statistically signiﬁcant. The same is true for the cross-section of
banking crises. The results from the business cycle model, however, suggest the opposite, though
the variable is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Consistent with the view that cronyism worsens agency problems and increases the likelihood of
fragility is the ﬁnding that corruption is, on average, worse in crisis countries (as measured by the
ICRG cor variable and the KKZ gr variable). This ﬁnding is statistically signiﬁcant in both the
cross-section banking crisis data and investment volatility data. The sign on the ICRG corruption
variable in the business cycle model is consistent with the story, but not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, then, corruption does not seem to facilitate business and smooth out agency problems.
4.2.3 Democracy and constraints on the use of power
Because governments are more likely to be motivated to serve the interests of the public if they
are accountable, one would expect that democracy would play an important role in ensuring that
governments serve the interests of the population. If industry is concentrated in the hands of a few,
and deposits are widely held, then governments in democracies may be more inclined to serve the
interests of the lenders rather than borrowers. Democracy is a disciplining device that ensures that
governments undertake better governance measures. On the other hand, democracy can itself be a
source of fragility, for two reasons. First, when the population has a substantial amount of savings
deposited in banks, democratic governments will keep the ﬁnancial system operating, but if the
size of deposits is small, then the pressure on governments to develop and maintain good
governance measures is also small. Second, governments can use their coercive power not only to
help enforce property rights, but to erode them. Democracy puts the government at the disposal of
competing interests, and to win and maintain power governments may be tempted to redistribute
income and wealth, thus eroding property rights and potentially contributing to the agency
problems faced by society.
The data set contains a number of variables on democracy. The Polity IV Project data set contains
four relevant variables: Democ, Autoc, Polity, and Parcomp. Democ is an index from 0 to 10 that
measures the extent to which the country is a democracy. Autoc is an index from 0 to 10 that
measures the extent to which the country is an autocracy; it is not simply a reﬂection of the
democracy score. The absence of any form of strong government may lead to low scores on both
counts. Polity is calculated as the difference between Democ and Autoc. Parcomp measures, on a
scale from 1 to 5, the extent to which participation in the political process is competitive, with
higher values representing greater competition. Other data sets also contain data on the
accountability of the government to the public. The ICRG data set contains the variable da43
(democratic accountability). This variable measures how responsive the government is to its
people. The KKZ data set has va (voice and accountability). It measures (from various sources)
different aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. The pright variable is
a measure of political rights taken from LLS (2002).
Another method of preventing government ofﬁcials from aiding in the diversion of funds from
lenders to borrowers is to put constraints on executive power. The Polity IV Project data set
contains a variable that measures this aspect of executive power directly: Exconst, an index from 1
to 7 that measures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of
chief executives. Higher values represent tighter constraints on executive power. In western
democracies, these constraints are often imposed by legislatures; they could also be imposed by
independent judiciaries. A ﬁnding that this variable is signiﬁcant in limiting banking crises
suggests that, left to their own devices, the most senior of government ofﬁcials are likely to be
tempted away from mitigating agency costs and may even contribute to them by assisting
borrowers to avoid repayment.
The results on democracy and constraints on political power are perhaps the most striking results
in this study. For each type of test, regardless of the variable or the source, the statistics reveal that
countries with unaccountable and unconstrained governments and ofﬁcials are more likely to
experience a ﬁnancial crisis. Only the political rights (pright) variable is not statistically
signiﬁcant in the investment volatility regression, whereas only the autocracy and polity measures
are not statistically signiﬁcant in the banking crisis cross-section. In the business cycle model,
both ICRG democratic accountability and the Exconst variables are statistically signiﬁcant. This
supports the view that, left to their own devices, government ofﬁcials tend to behave in ways that
aggravate agency problems rather than alleviate them and, as a result, ﬁnancial fragility is worse
in such countries.
4.2.4 Other variables (political and government stability)
There are a variety of political/government stability and agency problems. According to ICRG,
government stability refers to the ability of the government’s declared programs and its ability to
stay in ofﬁce. When government stability is high, there is certainty, which brings with it a
dimension of security over property rights (whether legally enforced or implicitly enforced
through reputation or other mechanisms). When government stability is low, the probability of a
change in government is raised; security over property is reduced and there is an increase in the
likelihood of a policy that could redistribute income and wealth. Thus, one plausible argument is
that political stability reinforces the existing set of property rights, whereas instability erodes44
them. According to this view, government stability alleviates agency problems and reduces the
likelihood of fragility in the ﬁnancial system. The data support this view. Both the government/
political stability variables are statistically signiﬁcant and suggest that stability is important for
ensuring a sound banking sector in the cross-section analysis, and the ICRG gs variable has the
expected sign and is signiﬁcant in the business cycle model. Both have the expected sign in the
investment volatility equation, with the KKZ variable being statistically signiﬁcant.
5. Conclusion
Good governance plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the extent to which a country is likely to
have a crisis. If one is prepared to go a step further and attempt to evaluate which institutions are
good and which are bad, then, on the basis of this study’s results, one would argue that institutions
that encourage a well-functioning market by recognizing and enforcing property rights, making
elected ofﬁcials more accountable, limiting the ability of government to directly interfere and
control the actions of ﬁrms, and reducing corruption and the abuse of public ofﬁce are worth
pursuing. Institutions that attempt to solve agency problems by having an unchecked government
become involved in the relationship between borrower and lender are likely to be associated with
increased ﬁnancial fragility, which suggests that such arrangements tend to leave governments
and ofﬁcials exposed to the temptations of ofﬁce that may exacerbate agency problems rather than
mitigate them.45
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